Can Shoes Catch a Culprit?
or Does a Shoeprint Lie?
United States v. Allen, 390 F.3d 944 (2004).
By Erin Daigh Armstrong
There
are many elements that go into planning the “perfect crime” and
numerous popular crime shows demonstrate the importance of physical
evidence in the criminal investigation process. Today it seems that it
would be nearly impossible for any individual to “get away with
murder”, or in the case of Anthony Allen, burglary.
In October 2001, the alarm of the Standard Federal Bank in Fort Wayne,
Indiana, was activated, and police were dispatched to the scene.
Officer Shane Hopkins, a local law enforcement officer who occasionally
aided in bank security, arrived first. Hopkins began a perimeter search
during which he observed an open ATM machine, the absence of normal
interior and security lighting, and then a masked individual exiting
from a rear door of the bank. The same suspect quickly reversed his
exit strategy, but was again stopped by the arrival of Officer Jeffrey
McCann on the scene; the suspect again reentered the bank.
Sometime shortly after the suspect reentered, Hopkins noticed another
masked individual hiding in shrubbery surrounding the bank lot. While
observing the second suspect, the first individual ran from the bank;
Hopkins pursued and notified dispatch of the suspect's direction after
he was unable to apprehend the individual. An observant citizen driving
in the nearby area reported seeing a suspicious person who matched the
general description of the suspect reported by Hopkins.
The sighting was reported by dispatch, and Officer Kenneth Fries,
estimating the general direction and distance the suspect would have
been able to cover in the elapsed time, drove to the Coliseum Park
Apartments where he located a man wearing clothing similar to that
observed by Hopkins. The man was, however, not wearing a ski mask.
After tracking the man for a short time, Fries lost sight and continued
to search the area until he met up with two other officers canvassing
the area. The three officers continued their search on foot, and
shortly thereafter, they located the same man Fries had noticed before
running north beside the creek. Despite verbal requests from the
officers to stop, the man continued to run away until reaching an
impassable area. It was at that time that Anthony Allen was apprehended
by the officers.
The Evidence in question
Subsequently, Allan was charged and convicted of committing and aiding
and abetting the burglary of the Standard Federal Bank. At his trial,
expert testimony was presented
Subsequently,
Allan was charged and convicted of committing and aiding and abetting
the burglary of the Standard Federal Bank. During his trial, expert
testimony was presented which stated that tennis shoe prints taken from
the scene could have been made by Allen's shoes. While the opinion of
the expert was not stated as “conclusive” evidence, it was one of the
issues raised by Allen on appeal. He argued that the shoe print
evidence was admissible under the guidelines established by the Supreme
Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Expert testimony and shoe print identification
The
admissibility of expert testimony is governed by the Federal Rules of
Evidence, specifically Federal Rule 702, and the standards applicable
in the present case were clarified in Daubert. Specifically,
the “prongs” that must be satisfied at the district court level in
order for expert testimony to be admissible are: (1) “whether the
expert would testify to valid scientific knowledge,” thereby satisfying
the reliability/validity requirement; and (2) whether the testimony
would help the jurors answer a question at issue in the case. The
latter prong is simply referred to as “relevance.”
One aspect of the expert testimony challenged by Allen was that the
shoe print evidence was not relevant, since the expert could not give a
conclusive opinion on whether Allen's shoes were the only ones that
could have matched the prints found at the scene of the crime. However,
the court decided that neither Federal Rule 702 nor Daubert
require that an expert witness be able to offer a determinative or
positive conclusion about the evidence that is presented. Many other
cases agree that “relevance” does not require that an expert “have an
opinion on the ultimate question to be resolved to satisfy the
relevance requirement. For that proposition, the court relied also on Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 715 (7th Cir., 2000).
Allen also challenged the admissibility of the expert's evidence on two
other points:: (1) any untrained individual could conduct the same
visual comparison of the prints, and therefore expert opinion testimony
was not required; and (2) shoe print identification is an unreliable
technique, because no outside review is available. However, additional
expert testimony by John Vanderkolk, then the Indiana State Police
crime laboratory manager in Fort Wayne, and Sandra Wiersema, FBI
forensic examiner, dismissed both arguments, stating that not only is
shoe print identification a widely accepted practice in the forensic
community, but it is also a technique that requires specialized
training and has been the subject of peer reviewed articles in the
forensic literature.
Allen
failed in all of his arguments on appeal, and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld his conviction on November
29, 2004. While shoe print identification evidence is not as widely
used as fingerprint and other more traditional forensic science
disciplines, it has traditionally been mentioned in criminal
investigation texts over many years. Furthermore, there appears to be a
growing literature studying and defining shoe print comparison
techniques. In light of the close scrutiny of expert opinion testimony
that the courts have been given to forensic sciences in the aftermath
of Daubert, perhaps one of the facets of this evidence that
made it more palatable, acceptable, and reasonable to the court was the
fact that the expert did not profess to be able to make an
identification that was 100% positive and with a zero error rate - a
conclusion that causes courts and other scientists to doubt the
scientific nature of the opinion evidence.
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