Skurtenis v. Jones, 236 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2000)
By Angela Jarvis
Sandy
Skurstenis was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. At
the time of the arrest, the officers found a handgun in the floorboard
of her car, for which she had an expired permit. Before placing her in
a holding cell at the stationhouse, a female officer, pursuant to a
policy mandating such searches of all inmates, took her aside and asked
her to strip down and to squat and cough. After an overnight stay, the
detainee was taken to the infirmary where a male nurse examined her
cranial and pubic hair for lice. Skurstenis was released approximately
an hour after the second search.
Skurstenis filed an
action under § 1983 for constitutional violations and under state law
for invasion of privacy, assault, and battery against the sheriff,
several of the officers, and the nurse's assistant. The district court
ruled that both searches were unconstitutional, but that the female
officer and her superiors were entitled to qualified immunity. With
respect to the second search, neither the sheriff nor the nurse's
assistant was entitled to qualified immunity. Skurstenis appealed the
court's decision granting immunity to the officers for the first
search. The Eleventh Circuit then found that both searches were
constitutional and made the following modifications with regard to the
district court's findings.
The Eleventh Circuit used the
Bell balancing test to assess the constitutionality of these searches.
"Bell balancing" is a Fourth Amendment test of reasonableness that must
be measured against an objective standard and "requires a balancing of
the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal
rights that the search entails." The relevant factors include the level
of intrusiveness of the search, or scope, the manner in which it is
conducted, the justification for it, and the place in which it occurs. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
First, the court looked at whether the search on the night of the
arrest was justified. The court joined many other jurisdictions in
concluding that a strip search is justifiable under the Fourth
Amendment if the officers have a "reasonable suspicion" that the
new-coming inmate may be concealing some sort of weapon in a body
cavity. In Skurstenis,
since the jail policy mandated strip searches for all detainees, even
when there is no reasonable suspicion that the detainee is carrying a
weapon, the policy was shot down as unconstitutional. However, the
question still remained as to whether the search of Skurstenis was
justified.
The Bell court had held, and
this court agreed, that a detention center is a place "fraught with
serious security dangers," therefore; the possession of a weapon by a
detainee at the time of the arrest provides the officers with a
reasonable suspicion to justify a strip search. Since Skurstenis was in
possession of a handgun at the time of her arrest, the court found that
the officer's search could be justified based on a reasonable suspicion
that she was concealing a weapon in a body cavity. The court also made
clear that as long as the police have the requisite reasonable
suspicion, the seriousness of the offense for which the person was
arrested is irrelevant.
Next, the court considered
whether the strip search on the night of the arrest was reasonable in
scope, manner, and location. One female officer observed Skurstenis in
private (in a bathroom) and no body cavity search took place. The court
found that this search was done in the "least intrusive manner."
As
for the strip search performed by the male nurse on the morning after
Skurstenis' arrest, the court found that in the State of Alabama, a
sheriff has the power and authority to establish a policy favoring more
intrusive searches for the prevention of the spread of disease in
jails. Head and body lice are of particular concern because of the
difficulties associated with abating the spread of these organisms in
jail populations. Although the sheriff's policy includes a mandatory
body search for communicable disease, the actual examination procedures
are established by the hospital and are taught by the hospital to its
employees. Also, the infirmary search is performed on a not-for-profit
basis pursuant to a contract between the county commission and a nearby
hospital, a not-for-profit corporation. The services are performed in
the jail and the county reimburses the hospital for their services and
supplies. The court found that, under these circumstances, the
infirmary search was justified.
The court then looked at
the other Bell balancing factors with regard to the second search. The
search took place in the infirmary, with only the inmate and the nurse
present. The court found the scope and the manner of the search to be
reasonable. The cranial and pubic hair was examined in a very
non-intrusive way, with no unnecessary touching or contact with the
genitals by the nurse. While the district court found it particularly
offensive that a male examined the female inmate, the circuit court
found this aspect of the search to be totally within the bounds of a
search by medical personnel. The court agreed with a handful of other
circuit courts that have ruled that while a search by prison personnel
must be by a same-sex officer, a search by medical personnel need not
be. Torres v. Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services, 859 F.2d 1523 (7th Cir. 1988); Bonitz v. Fair, 804 F.2d 164 (1st Cir. 1986); Daughtery v. Harris, 476 F.2d 292 (10th Cir. 1973); Tribble v. Gardner, 860 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1988); Hurley v. Ward, 584 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1978).
Both the district court and Skurstenis called attention to the fact
that the second search was conducted only a few minutes before she was
released, so the disease prevention justification seems to no longer
apply. The Eleventh Circuit found this fact to be inconsequential.
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