Lip Print Conviction Reversed - New Trial Ordered
On
March 7, 2006, the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Kane County, Illinois,
released the order of Judge Timothy Q. Sheldon, reversing the
conviction of Lavelle L. Davis, and remanding the case for a new trial.
Lavelle Davis had been convicted of murdering Patrick Ferguson in
Elgin, Illinois, in February, 1997. The main evidence against him
consisted of a purported “lip print” photographed from a roll of duct
tape found near the scene of the crime; it was the only physical
evidence used by the State to connect Lavelle Davis to the crime. The
conviction was later upheld on May 12, 1999, by the intermediate
appellate court of Illinois. See the related story at:
Lip Print Identification Anyone? (On People v. Davis - Ill.)
On November 9, 2005, the Circuit Court of Kane County held a hearing on
Mr. Davis' petition for post conviction relief. As grounds for relief,
petitioner claimed that his constitutional rights to due process, a
fair trial, and effective assistance of counsel under the Fifth. Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
parallel provisions of the Illinois Constitution were violated.
According to the Court's Order, Mr. Davis cited four specific examples
of such violations.
1. Trial counsel failed to investigate and properly prepare the case
for trial. Defense counsel engaged in little or no pretrial
investigation and ignored Lavelle Davis' attempts to communicate with
him regarding potential witnesses and defenses. Trial counsel also
failed to provide defendant with discovery materials received from the
State. In general, defense counsel's ill health and high blood pressure
rendered him incapable of properly representing at trial a defendant
charged with first degree murder and facing the death penalty.
2. Trial counsel also failed to attack the use of a purported “lip
print” even though it was the only physical evidence used by the State
to connect Lavelle Davis to this crime and this was the first known
case in which such evidence was being used. Counsel failed to request a
pretrial hearing to attack the use of such evidence, and failed to
conduct even a simple investigation which would have led to the finding
of experts who believe “lip print” evidence to be “junk science” and
unreliable as sole evidence of guilt in a court of law.
3. Trial counsel also failed to investigate Lavelle Davis' alibi
defense. The murder occurred in Elgin on December 18, 1993, at
approximately 5:00 p.m. Lavelle Davis was in the City of Chicago on
that date and time. Trial counsel failed to contact and present at
trial witnesses whose names and addresses were supplied to him by
Lavelle Davis.
4. Trial counsel failed to impeach the State's main witness with
materials available to him before trial. Two letters which would have
been pivotal in the cross-examination of the chief prosecution witness
were not used by trial counsel, who stated in a post-trial motion that
he did not see these letters and would have used them. In the letters,
the prosecution's chief witness admitted to lying about the facts of
the case because she was scared and did not want to go to jail. Defense
counsel further failed to impeach that same principal prosecution
witness with a deal she had previously made with the State to testify
in accordance with her statements to the police in exchange for a
dismissal of a felony charge she had pending against her.
At the Kane County post conviction hearing on November 9, 2005, Lavelle
Davis court-appointed counsel called several witnesses.
The first witness was Professor Andre Moenssens, a fingerprint expert
whose curriculum vitae with his extensive qualifications in the
forensic sciences was received as an exhibit. Moenssens testified as to
the accuracy and reliability of fingerprint identification and its
acceptance in the forensic community and in state and federal courts.
Professor Moenssens testified that, inasmuch he had stated in his
fourth edition of the treatise Scientific Evidence in Civil and
Criminal Cases he had written that lip print identification was not
recognized as an accepted science, upon learning of the Davis appeal
which affirmed defendant's conviction he began to further review and
study lip print identification and found no scientific studies that
have established the accuracy and reliability of lip print
identification. He testified that the forensic science community has
not accepted a methodology appropriate to perform lip print
identifications and that, to his knowledge, there are no appellate
decisions anywhere in the world accepting lip print identification as
accurate or reliable.
Moenssens took issue with the qualifications of a State document
examiner and a State fingerprint examiner to conduct lip print
examinations, as well as with their conclusions testifying at the Davis
trial that lip print identifications based on creases were similar to
fingerprint identifications based on friction ridge details. He stated
that the prosecution's trial experts lacked any basis for their
opinions that their lip match was based on a reasonable degree of
scientific certainty. Moenssens also stressed that there were no
current and satisfactory peer reviewed publications beyond some
occasional literature articles suggesting all lips contained unique and
different detail that could be compared. He asserted there was no
accepted comparison methodology in a professional forensic science
discipline; there were no training programs for lip print examiners;
there existed no databases containing a significant number of lip
prints that had been studied by scientists; nor was there any
certification program for lip print examiners.
He specifically contradicted the testimony of one of the State's expert
witnesses on lip prints who had testified at trial that lip print
comparison is generally accepted as a reliable means of scientific
comparison and that the FBI Laboratory considers it to be a positive
form of identification.
Counsel for LaVelle Davis introduced as an exhibit a letter from a Unit
Chief in the latent fingerprint unit of the Forensic Analysis Section
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that stated: “The FBI Laboratory
has not conducted any validation studies of lip print identification
and has determined that it will not perform lip print analysis.”
Michael Sinke was also called as an expert witness at the hearing on
the post-conviction petition. He is a forensic examiner specializing in
latent print identification with 25 years of experience in the Michigan
State Police, of which he spent 21 years in the forensic science
division of that department. He has compared hundreds of thousands of
individual fingerprint and palm print comparisons to latent prints, and
has also qualified some 250 times as an expert witnesses in state and
federal courts related to latent print identifications. Mr. Sinke
testified that he was unable to say that the questioned lip print and
the known lip print were made by the same individual to any degree of
scientific certainty. His conclusion was that the prints could not be
matched and he found notable discrepancies between the known and the
crime scene impressions.
Mr. Sinke also disputed that an examination of the ridges on
fingerprints is conducted in the same manner as that of creases on
lips, as the State's experts had maintained at trial; Sinke stated the
two types of markings were totally different. He also opined that the
skills of the state's document examiner, who had testified to
qualifying as a fingerprint examiner, would have diminished because he
was not current in his fingerprint comparison analysis and had been
largely occupied in supervisory capacities.
Sinke specifically evaluated Mr. Davis' known lip print with the
questioned lip print and identified several discrepancies that were of
great concern to him. He concluded, to a reasonable degree of forensic
certainty, that “there was no way you could say” that the questioned
lip print and the known lip print came from the same individual.
The defense counsel at trial, Attorney Lebert B. Bastiononi, because of
ioll health, testified by videotape deposition. He didn't have his file
on Mr. Davis anymore, having gotten rid of it. He practices law out of
his house as a sole practitioner, with his wife acting as his
secretary, although she had a full-time job elsewhere. He has voice
mail to answer his telephone calls, suffers from Parkinson's Disease,
had a heart attack in 1983, had a pacemaked implanted, and has had
three angioplasties and three stints implanted. He takes nine to twelve
pills daily and is considering retirement.
Mr. Bastiononi remembered that he was under doctor's care for severe
stress and significantly elevated blood pressure while he represented
Davis; he remembers missing court dates on the Davis case because he
was sick or at another courtroom. He testified that the lip print
evidence was the only physical evidence that linked Davis to the crime;
that he attempted to keep the evidence out; and that he felt the
outcome of the trial would have been different had the lip print
evidence been excluded.
He also stated that he told the trial court on February 9, 1995, that
“now that the state has a conclusive match (lip print), so that is
going to require me to get an expert,” but failed to follow through. He
testified that he inquired from a few sources about finding an expert
witness, but didn't find anyone and was also told by the defendant's
family they didn't have any money to hire an expert. He never attempted
to determine how much it would cost to hire an expert witness, and
couldn't remember if he had ever consulted with the petitioner about an
expert. He also never did anything to establish Davis' indigency with
the trial court, or if the court would pay for an expert, though he
opined that at the time of the Davis trial there was a reasonable good
faith argument that lip print evidence was not a valid and reliable
means of identification.
The last witness at the hearing was Professor Jeffrey Urdangen of the
Northwestern University School of Law, an experienced former trial
lawyer, whom the court recognized as an expert in the field of criminal
defense representation and the Supreme Court rulings on effective
representation by counsel.
Professor Urdangen found that Attorney Bastiononi did not meet the
prevailing norms of professional competence in his efforts on behalf of
petitioner, and was especially deficient in his handling of the
admissibility and treatment of lip print evidence. Bastiononi's
deficiences concerned his lack of a search for defense experts,
challenging or rebutting other ambiguous, conflicting or uncertain
prosecution witness testimony; and in more than a dozen of different
ways failing to act as a competent trial attorney in a major criminal
case, not the least of which was the failure to call the alibi
witnesses, which left the lip print testimony totally unrebutted,
amounted to a denial of the right to effective representation under the
constitution.
In the court's order reversing the conviction and remanding the case,
Judge Sheldon not only cited and relied on the various items discussed
above, but stressed that the eyewitness's testimony was contradicted
and suspect, and that the eyewitness had admitted he lied to the police
and was unable to identify Davis as a suspect. Another state's
witness's testimony at trial was, in the words of the judge's order,
“wrought with contradictions and lies and inconsistencies.” The
defendant was never linked to any of the items of physical evidence
found at the crime scene, such as the shot gun, the shot gun shell, the
nylons, a hair, and work gloves. He concluded that the trial attorney's
performance fell well below an objective standard of effective
assistance of counsel as mandated by the United States Supreme Court in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984).
After going through the long list of counsel deficiencies, the judge
stressed that the State had centered its entire case around the lip
print identification evidence, and that the prosecutor “made at least
16 detailed references to the lip print evidence in its closing
argument, characterizing it as unbiased and scientific corroboration of
petitioner's guilt.” The judge opined that if the testimony presented
at the post conviction hearing had been presented before the trial
court, the lip print evidence would likely not have been admitted.
It is not known at this time whether the State of Illinois will seek to appeal Judge Sheldon's order.
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